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Abstract 
 
This paper examines welfare participation dynamics during 199396, the initial years 
of Iowas welfare reform, a reform remarkably similar to the states current Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Analyses of the Family Investment 
Program (FIP) participation over the programs first two years show that, on average, FIP 
recipients stayed fewer months in the second year compared with the first, although a 
relatively large share of participants (36 percent) stayed on for the full two years. A fixed 
effects model and a semiparametric duration model are used to examine welfare 
dependence and recidivism. Iowas experience suggests that human capital, child support, 
marital status, and the presence of children will be significant factors in reducing time on 
TANF and recidivism. Child support and wage income are crucial in determining the 
degrees of success for exiting and staying off, especially during the early months of the 
exit. 
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WELFARE DEPENDENCE, RECIDIVISM, AND THE FUTURE 
FOR RECIPIENTS OF TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE 
FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Welfare programs were originally designed to alleviate poverty among single-parent 
families during economic downturns. Although these public assistance programs did 
provide a safety net for people in need, often they were linked to undesirable outcomes, 
such as increased out-of-wedlock births, and were thought to create disincentives for 
recipients to work. The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program was 
established under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) in 1996 with the explicit objectives of: (1) providing assistance to needy 
families; (2) ending welfare dependence by promoting job preparation, work, and 
marriage; (3) preventing and reducing out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and (4) encouraging 
the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. TANF tightens benefit eligibility 
criteria by implementing a five-year lifetime limit on receiving benefits, invoking stricter 
work and education requirements to qualify for benefits, and strengthening the 
enforcement of child support obligations. Although state governments now have nearly 
full authority to administer their TANF programs, they will be required to have 50 
percent of the program participants involved in approved work activities by 2002, or face 
sanctions in the form of reduced federal funding. 
In 1993, the State of Iowa, through waivers, implemented reforms creating the 
Family Investment Program (FIP), a program similar to TANF created under PRWORA. 
The FIPs goals of helping program recipients leave poverty and become self-supporting 
parallel the intent of TANF and PRWORA (Holcomb et al., 1998; Iowa Department of 
Human Services 1996). The FIP merged and coordinated several existing programs and 
tied support for job training, education, child care, and transportation more directly to 
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income transfers. Iowa has had to change FIP very little to meet current federal 
guidelines. Thus, Iowa has over six years of experience under a program with rules and 
incentives similar to those instituted only recently nationwide.  
This paper examines the dynamics of welfare participation during the pre-TANF 
period of Iowas welfare reform. The analyses make use of a unique data set containing 
linked state administrative records. These data are ideal studies across time because key 
variables are available on a monthly basis. This research has the specific objective of 
determining how programmatic, demographic and macroeconomic factors relate to 
dependence and recidivism among program participants. Along with providing insights 
into how TANF requirements might impact program participation among low-income 
families, this study also contributes to the literature through its use of administrative data 
for the empirical analyses and its rigorous attention to data-related estimation issues.  
In section two, we review existing research. In section three, we outline the main 
features of the Iowa administrative data used here. We also discuss the benefits and 
drawbacks of using administrative data for research purposes. Section four details a key 
issue: the multiple imputation procedure used for assigning values to cases that do not 
report educational attainment. Section five provides descriptive analyses of the dynamics 
of FIP participation. In section six, we present a fixed effects model of welfare 
dependence and estimate the determinants of time staying on FIP. The fixed effect model 
allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity. We employ a semiparametric duration 
model, and examine the distribution of the first period following exit from the program 
and incidence of recidivism. The semiparametric approach has the advantage of not 
requiring distributional assumptions on the duration of the exit spells. In section seven, 
we conclude the paper by drawing several policy implications from our findings. 
 
Literature Review 
The majority of the early literature on welfare participation focuses on either the 
probability of participation at a point in time (Moffitt 1983, 1986; Robins 1986; Blank 
1989a; Blank and Ruggles 1996; Hu 1999) or exit rates related to a welfare spell 
(Plotnick 1983; ONeil et al. 1987; Ellwood 1986; Blank 1989b; Fitzgerald 1991). These 
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studies find that greater nonwage income, higher wage rates, more years of schooling, 
fewer children, good health, and being white are related to lower participation rates and 
higher exit rates. Moreover, these studies also show the existence of negative duration 
dependence that occurs when the exit rate falls as the duration of the welfare spell 
lengthens. Moffitt (1992) reviews the concepts and measures of welfare dependence 
presented in this early literature. He finds that the most common definition of welfare 
dependence focuses on the length of a single welfare spell; this measure does not 
consider the high reentry (recidivism) rates among welfare recipients. 
National studies, most conducted using data collected prior to PRWORA and TANF, 
show that a substantial proportion of those who exited the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program, the predecessor of TANF, returned. Meyer and 
Cancian (1996) examine data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79) and find that 37 percent of women who exited returned within one year; 50 
percent returned within two years. Harris (1996) examines the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics data and finds that 27 percent of the welfare exiters returned in one year; 42 
percent returned within two years. (www.isr.umich.edu/src/psid/) 
Only recently, with increasing concern by policymakers about welfare dependence 
and recidivism, have researchers begun to look at welfare recidivism and multiple 
participation spells. Blank and Ruggles (1994) use the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) data to study short-term recidivism among households headed by 
single mothers with children under age 19. They find that 20 percent of former AFDC 
recipients returned to the program before the end of the sample period. Their results also 
show that the average post-AFDC spell is six months, implying that most of the single 
mothers returned to AFDC relatively quickly. Cao (1996), using NLSY79 data, confirms 
Blank and Ruggless finding of considerable reoccurrence of welfare recipiency. 
Important determinants of recidivism identified in the literature include having fewer 
years of education, not being married, and having little job experience (Sandefur and 
Cook 1997; Brandon 1995). Caos (1996) analyses indicate that initial welfare 
dependency and recidivism are correlated with the recipients age, years of education, 
marital status, ethnic origin, and region. 
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Born et al. (1998) provide preliminary analyses of administrative data from the 
Maryland Family Investment Program. Nearly 20 percent of the cases they examined 
were reopened within the first three to six months post-exit. Reentry rates were lowest 
among women who exited for employment reasons. Born et al. also find that women 
whose exits were short-lived tended to have younger children than those women who 
managed to stay off of the program. 
Each of these studies, with the exception of Born et al. (1998), is limited in two 
ways. First, they examine participation in and outcomes related to the recently abolished 
AFDC program. Second, each study relies on data obtained directly from program 
participants through surveys. The Joint Center for Poverty Research at Northwestern 
Universitys Advisory Panel on Research Uses of Administrative Data reports that 
current national survey research data cannot adequately monitor the diverse, local 
programs currently being established by state and local governments. (Hotz et al. 1998). 
Hotz et al. continue by noting that the advantages of administrative data over survey data 
include the level of detail and accuracy of the data, larger sample sizes, and lower costs. 
Disadvantages of using administrative data for research include working with samples 
limited to individuals having experienced some event or some particular transaction; 
measures and variables collected to manage and monitor ongoing programs, not collected 
for research purposes; and time frames that correspond, in principle, to periods of being 
enrolled in a program. The current study advances the literature by examining effects and 
outcomes of an assistance program quite similar to the TANF programs that have been 
established in many states. Also, through analyses of administrative data, the current 
study is not hindered by biases inherent in analyses of data obtained through surveys. 
 
Data 
Iowa was one of the early states to link administrative data across programs to 
support program administration and policy analysis. In 1995, a project was designed to 
develop administrative data systems for research purposes. The product of this effort was 
a three-year (April 1993 to March 1996) longitudinal data file that matches and merges 
FIP, Medicaid, Food Stamp Program (FSP), child support, and quarterly earnings records 
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for all FIP recipients during this period. The FIP, FSP, and Medicaid represent the key 
assistance programs for low-income families; child support and earnings are the key 
sources of nonpublic assistance income. These data are specific as to amounts (e.g., 
program benefits, child support received, and earnings) and dates (e.g., program exit and 
reentry). They are preferred over survey data because of their specificity. And, the data 
are not subject to problems related to respondent recall and respondent bias. Data are 
linked for all FIP recipients in April 1993. Observations (cases) are added to the file as 
they enter FIP; cases are followed throughout the data period, even after exiting FIP. 
We supplement the administrative data file in two ways. First, we classify each 
county as being metro or nonmetro (Butler and Beale 1994). Second, we merge monthly 
county unemployment rates and county income per capita to account for the effect of 
local economic conditions in our analyses. Monthly county unemployment rates are 
available from the Iowa Workforce Development. 
We create a two-year panel data set, beginning October 1993, the start of the FIP 
program, and ending September 1995. All cases identified as receiving FIP benefits in 
October 1993 (n=38,632) are included in the panel. No samples are drawn for these 
analyses. We observe 22,080 FIP exits among these cases, where exit is defined as being 
inactive (i.e., no benefits) for two months in a row. The total number of observations for 
the empirical analyses is reduced to 32,309 after deleting cases with missing information 
other than educational attainment. 
Although the Iowa linked data set includes detailed information on child support 
collections, FIP participation, and quarterly wage earnings, the household and 
demographic variables are limited. Available information includes the educational 
attainment of the case heads household, as well as age, marital status, ethnic origin, 
gender, disability status, and county of residence. The number of children in the 
household also is known. Unfortunately, it is not mandatory to provide educational 
attainment when applying for FIP, and about 50 percent of our observations have missing 
data on education. Comparison of the sample means of variables including and excluding 
observations with missing education fails to support the assumption that the occurrences 
of missing data on educational attainment are distributed randomly throughout the 
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population. Because deleting nonrandom missing data would lead to biased estimates and 
a loss of information, we develop a statistical procedure for imputing education. The 
imputation procedure is discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
Multiple Imputation Procedure for Missing Educational Data 
We employ a multiple imputation procedure proposed by Herzog and Rubin (1983), 
and Rubin (1987), to compensate for missing educational attainment data. Multiple 
imputations are repeated random draws from a model generating nonresponse. This 
approach is favored over a single imputation because it incorporates the uncertainty about 
the accuracy of imputed values. Multiple imputation increases the efficiency of 
estimation and allows us to derive valid inferences simply by combining complete data 
inferences. This procedure also allows us to examine the sensitivity of inferences to 
different models that generate nonresponses. 
The multiple imputation procedure begins by assigning each observation to one of 
six distributional patterns based on the availability of the educational attainment measure 
across the eight quarters of data. (See Table 1.). It is clear that most of the observations 
have either no missing data or data are missing completely for all eight quarters. These 
two groups account for almost 94 percent of the sample. Next we examine the 
distribution of the education variable for those cases with full information (n=16,010) to 
determine the algorithm of imputation. Table 2 details the distribution for this group 
relative to whether or not the case head had a high school degree at that time. As we 
expected, most individuals (97 percent) did not change categories over the two-year 
period. In other words, if an individual did not have a high school degree in October 
1993, he/she did not receive it by September 1995. Twice as many case heads had a high 
school degree (63.8 percent) as did not (33.1 percent) in this group for which we have full 
information. 
Next, we estimate a logit regression to predict educational attainment. We assume 
that educational attainment is related to (i.e., can be predicted by) a set of variables (N 
variables) that includes gender, race, marital status, an indicator of living in a metro 
county, the number of children in the household, quarterly wage income, total numbers of 
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months on FIP, the amount of child support received, the county unemployment rate, and 
county income per capita. To account for the uncertainty about the accuracy of the 
imputed values, the estimated coefficients and their variance-covariance matrix are 
viewed as the posterior distribution of the true parameters. Hence, we have an N-variable 
normal distribution with means equal to the estimated coefficients and variance-
covariance equal to the estimated variance-covariance matrix. 
We draw a random sample of values for the N variables from the posterior normal 
distribution and use these drawn N coefficients to calculate the predicted probability of a 
specific educational status, for example, having a high school degree. Then, we randomly 
draw a value from a uniform distribution and compare it with the predicted probability. If 
the predicted probability (of having a high school degree) is greater than the random 
value, we assign the predicted education status (i.e., high school degree) to the missing 
value; otherwise, the alternative (no high school degree) is assigned. We repeat the above 
procedures five times using five sets of explanatory variable values randomly drawn from 
the posterior distribution. This approach results in five complete data sets that we use in 
our analyses of welfare dependence and recidivism. 
The N x 1 column vectors of estimated parameters and variances can be obtained, 
respectively: )Var( and 
ii
ββ , i=1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Because we are interested in estimating the 
true parameter vector, β , these 5 sets of 
i
β s are combined to form the following 
inference about β : 
*ββ −  is approximately normally distributed with mean 0 and variance BV +∗ , 
where 5
5
1i
i
* ∑
=
= ββ  and 5)Var(
5
1i
i
* ∑
=
= βV . B is an N x 1 column vector with 
elements ∑
=
•
=−=
5
1i
2*
j1ij1j1 N 3,..., 2, 1,j  ,4)(b ββ , where ij1β  and *j1•β  are the elements 
of 
i
β  and *
i
β , respectively. As a result, the variance estimates are the sum of (1) the 
average variances of the estimated variances and (2) the variances across the five 
multiple imputations. 
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The main challenge we face when imputing missing educational attainment is the 
computational difficulty of predicting the joint probabilities for eight quarters under an 
eight-variable normal distribution. That is, we must consider the eight separate quarters 
simultaneously. We make two simplifying assumptions to reduce the computational and 
modeling burden. First, we impute for only those cases with the patterns of missing data 
that are shown in Table 1. We delete the other 474 observations (1.6 percent) with 
missing educational data. Consequently, there are 16,299 observations with education 
missing for at least one quarter.  
Second, given that 97 percent of the observations with full information did not 
change educational status over the two years (from Table 2), we use a carryover 
approach with the quarterly imputations. We first predict the joint outcome of quarter 1 
and quarter 5 for observations with education missing in all quarters (n=14,674; row 2 
from Table 1). Then, the predicted value of quarter 1 is carried over to quarters 2, 3, and 
4, and the predicted value of quarter 5 is carried over to quarters 6, 7, and 8. For other 
cases with missing data in year 1 (n=320 and n=110; rows 4 and 5 from Table 1, 
respectively), we impute educational attainment for quarter 1 and carry over that value 
when data are missing in quarters 2, 3, and 4. Finally, we predict educational attainment 
in quarter 6 for observations in row 3 (n=1,195) of Table 1. The predicted value is carried 
over to quarters 7 and 8. 
The multiple imputations generate 6,593 observations (40.5 percent) with no high 
school degree for two years, 9,436 observations (57.9 percent) with at least a high school 
degree for two years, and 270 observations (1.6 percent) experiencing a change in 
educational attainment (receiving their high school degree) some time during the two-
year period. 
 
Participation in the Family Investment Program (FIP) 
We next examine the dynamics of FIP participation. During the data period, the 
overall FIP caseload initially increased and then fell. The initial caseload increases 
resulted from the more generous FIP income disregards and the stronger support 
programs that were introduced in 1993 (Fraker et al. 1998). Caseload characteristics are 
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reported in Table 3 for the cases in the linked data set that we identify as being FIP active 
for October 1993, October 1994, and October 1995. We identify the active FIP caseload 
within about 3 percent for the three monthly periods reported in Table 3.1  About 90 
percent of the FIP cases received food stamps, and, as expected, almost all cases included 
households with children. Of these cases, 40 percent had a single adult with child(ren) 
and 87 percent of the case heads were female. 
We are interested in knowing how many long-term welfare recipients in the first 
year, defined as receiving FIP benefits for at least seven months between October 1993 
and September 1994, achieved economic self-sufficiency during the following 12-month 
period, October 1994 to September 1995.2  We separate months on FIP in the first year 
into three distinct groups: 1-6 months, 7-11 months, and 12 months. The same 
classifications are applied to the second year (October 1994 to September 1995) except 
we add one more category: 0 months.3 
Table 4 shows that in the first year, 83 percent (21.0 percent + 62.4 percent) of the 
FIP recipients are long-term recipients (7 months or more receiving FIP). This number 
drops to 58 percent (17.7 percent + 39.9 percent) in the second year. Recipients staying 
off of FIP for at least six months in the first year were more likely to continue this 
participation pattern or to become self-sufficient (annual numbers of months are 0) in the 
second year. Seventy-eight percent of short-term recipients (1-6 months) in the first year 
were nonrecipients in the second year. On the other hand, only about half of the long-
term recipients (7-11 months and 12 months) in the first year have fewer months of 
receipt in the second year. Fifty-eight percent of those who were FIP recipients for all 12 
months of the first year continued to stay on FIP for all of the second year. 
Table 5 examines differences in case characteristics based on the length of FIP 
participation over the two-year period. We classify the sample into five mutually 
exclusive groups: (1) staying 0 months on FIP in the second year, (2) staying fewer 
months in the second year, (3) staying equal months in the second year, (4) staying more 
months in the second year, and (5) staying on all 24 months of the two-year period.  
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Table 5a reports annual averages for each year of data and the bottom panel provides 
growth rates between the two years. Note that relative to Table 4, we have deleted cases 
with missing values. As a result, the number of observations is reduced to 32,309. 
It is clear that the majority of recipients had fewer months of FIP in the second year: 
56 percent either did not receive FIP benefits or stayed fewer months on FIP in the 
second year; whereas only 6 percent of the cases were more dependent on FIP. Thirty-six 
percent of the cases, however, relied on FIP for all 24 months. The comparison of 
demographic characteristics for the five groups reveals that FIP recipients staying fewer 
months on FIP in the second year not only had higher average wage income, greater child 
support income, fewer children, and more years of schooling (Table 5a), but also 
experienced greater magnitudes of growth in wage income, child support, and the 
percentage of being married, as well as smaller increases in the number of children 
(Table 5b) compared with those with more months or all months on FIP. The most 
distinct contrast is between the 0 Month and Fewer Months groups, and the More 
Months group. FIP recipients staying longer in the second year had almost no growth in 
wage income and a significant decline in the amount of child support received. 
Results for the percentage employed and quarters worked show that although 
cases in the 24 Months group have the lowest percentage of cases employed and the 
lowest average number of quarters worked, the growth rates for both variables are among 
the highest for the five groups. Their average wage income grew 28 percent. 
Unfortunately, as can be seen by the annual wage income for this group, they have the 
furthest to go to achieve economic self-sufficiency. 
Sixty percent of cases in the 24 Months group hold at least a high school degree. 
But, their average wage income is 40 percent lower than that of recipients staying fewer 
months in the second year. The percentage living in a metro county is stable over time 
and does not vary much across groups. An interesting finding is that both the 0 Month 
and the 24 Months groups have the lowest mobility rates (i.e., percentage of cases 
reporting moving to another county between year one and year two). By contrast, the 
More Months group has the highest mobility rate, nearly 12 percent.  
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Empirical Analysis of Welfare Dependence and Recidivism 
We next examine welfare dependence through the annual number of months on FIP 
and recidivism through the duration of the first exit spell. We discuss the methods of 
analysis in detail in the following two subsections. 
 
Welfare Dependence: Annual Number of Months on FIP 
Method of Estimation and Definition of Variables. We estimate a fixed effect model 
to fully utilize our panel data. A fixed effect model allows us to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, which will bias the estimates if ignored. The annual total months on FIP 
for each case in each year is our measure of welfare dependence. A welfare recipient is 
said to have greater welfare dependence if he/she stays on FIP longer in a given year. 
Variables determining welfare dependence include total annual child support collections, 
predicted quarterly wage rate, average annual local unemployment rate, number of 
children in the household, an indicator of county of residence (metro or nonmetro), and 
marital status. Time invariant variables such as gender, race, and ethnic origin are 
excluded from the fixed effect model. 
Because wage income is an important predictor of FIP participation, and because 
decisions regarding labor force and FIP participation are jointly determined, we use an 
instrumental variable approach to control for endogeneity. The instruments include age, 
education, local unemployment rate, gender, income per capita of the county of 
residence, share of county population with a college degree, and an indicator of residing 
in a metro county. We predict the highest quarterly income during the year instead of 
predicting annual wage income, because this measure better captures the labor market 
potential of FIP recipients. 
We create four indicators for transitions in marital status during the year: (1) become 
married; (2) become divorced or separated; (3) remain single, and (4) remain married. 
Two additional variables, number of quarters being married and number of quarters being 
divorced or separated, are also calculated. They are used to form the following two 
interaction terms: (1) the number of quarters being married and the indicator for become 
married and (2) the number of quarters being divorced or separated and the indicator for 
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become divorced or separated. These two interaction terms allow us to estimate 
simultaneously the effects of changes in marital status and the length of time in the new 
status on annual total time on FIP. Table 6 presents the empirical definitions of variables 
and descriptive statistics for the sample used in the study. 
Our empirical specification of the fixed effect model is as follows: 
ij4ij3ij2ij1iij NUMCHILDβURATEβPWAGEβCSβαMONTHS ++++=  (1) 
2, 1,j  n; 3,..., 2, 1,i            
εDMETROβDSINGLEβ                               
)QDIVORCED*(DDIVORCEDβDDIVORCEDβ                               
)QMARRIED*(DMARRIEDβDMARRIEDβ                               
ijij10ij9
ijij8ij7
ijij6ij5
==
+++
++
++
 
where iα  represents the effects of unobserved variables peculiar to the i
th individual and 
these effects remain constant over time, j represents the year, and ijε  is the error term, 
which varies by individuals and time. 
We expect that greater child support collections decrease the annual total time on 
FIP. On the other hand, a higher annual local unemployment rate and more children in 
the household should increase the annual total time on FIP. Predicted quarterly wage 
income is expected to be negatively related to total time on FIP. Living in metro counties 
could be positively related to annual total time on FIP because the stigma of welfare may 
not be as strong as it is for those living in nonmetro areas, or (and) the network of private 
support resources is not as great as it is for those living in nonmetro counties. Individuals 
who remain married for the entire year should have the fewest months staying on FIP 
relative to those with other marital status. As for the interaction terms, the longer a person 
is married (divorced or separated), the shorter (longer) he/she stays on FIP. 
Empirical Results. The empirical results are reported in Table 7. Our model fits the 
data relatively well. The null hypothesis of a common intercept for all observations is 
rejected, suggesting that the fixed effect model is favored over ordinary least squares. 
The signs of the coefficients are consistent with the predictions and most are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. Using the estimated coefficients in Table 7, we calculate 
elasticities evaluated at the sample means. 
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We find that higher wage income significantly reduces the total time spent on FIP. 
Because we predicted quarterly wage income, the coefficient implies that if total annual 
wage income increases by $4,000 ($1,000 for each of four quarters), total time on FIP is 
reduced by 4.5 months. Expressed in elasticities, if total annual wage income increases by 
1 percent, the annual number of months on FIP will decline by 1.12 percent. Greater child 
support collections reduce the annual total time on FIP. A $1,000 increase in annual child 
support reduces the average annual total months on FIP by 1.5 months. In terms of 
elasticity, the results show that annual total time on FIP falls by 0.1 percent when child 
support increases by 1 percent. If child support were to double (100 percent increase), the 
average annual total months on FIP would decrease by 10 percent or 0.86 months.  
Local economic conditions have a strong effect on the annual total months on FIP. 
An increase of 1 percent in the unemployment rate would lengthen the annual stay on FIP 
by 1.3 months. The elasticity with respect to the local unemployment rate is 0.57, 
suggesting that the low unemployment rate in Iowa contributed to the decline in Iowas 
FIP caseloads, and FIP caseloads are sensitive to changes in economic conditions. If the 
unemployment rate in the second year (3.59 percent) increases to a higher level, 5.5 
percent for example, we could expect the annual total months on FIP to increase from 7 
to 9.6 months. Consistent with other studies, the number of children in the household 
increases the annual number of months on FIP. One additional child in the household will 
add 0.38 months to the annual total months on FIP. 
For marital status, the baseline group is those who remain married during the 12 
months. The results indicate that the baseline group stays fewer months on FIP compared 
with others. FIP recipients who were married for 3 quarters during the year stay 0.17 (i.e., 
1.43-0.42*3) months longer than the baseline group. Those married one and two quarters 
stayed 0.59 and 1.01 months longer, respectively. The remain single group stays 0.86 
months longer on FIP than the baseline group. The coefficients on the indicator of 
divorced or separated and its interaction term have the expected signs, but are statistically 
insignificant. FIP recipients living in a metro county stay 0.5 months longer on FIP than 
do others, all else equal. 
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Welfare Recidivism: Duration of the First Exit Spell 
Definitions of Variables and Distribution of First Exit Spells. We analyze the first 
exit spell to gain a better understanding of welfare recidivism. An exit is said to occur 
when a FIP recipient leaves the program for at least 2 consecutive months. Hence, an exit 
spell ranges between 2 and 23 months in our data. We require 2 consecutive months with 
$0 in FIP benefits to avoid problems with individuals counted as an exit due to 
administrative delays, or due to an individual not receiving a benefit in the short term to 
reasons of sanction or being eligible for a benefit of less than $10.4 If the first exit spell of 
a case lasts only for a single month, we choose the next valid exit spell. There are 18,382 
exit spells in our sample of 32,309 cases. 
Column one in Table 8 shows the distribution for all exit spells. We further separate 
the exit spells into complete spells and right-censored spells because their distributions 
are different. Twenty-five percent of the exit spells are complete before the end of our 
sample period; the remaining spells are right-censored. The average length of all exit 
spells is 11 months. The average length of the complete spell, however, is six months, 
which suggests that for those who returned to FIP, the duration of their exit spell is 
relatively short. Also, our spell data reveal negative duration dependence. That is, the 
probability of recidivism is a function of the length of the exit spell. The longer an 
individual stays off of FIP, the less likely she/he is to return to FIP. 
Estimation Procedure. A semiparametric proportional hazard model with time-
varying covariates is applied to our grouped duration data (Prentice and Gloeckler 1978; 
Kiefer, 1990). The advantage of the semiparametric method is that the baseline hazard is 
nonparametric and is estimated along with the coefficients of the explanatory variables 
through a maximum likelihood procedure. 
We grouped the exit spells by duration into eight mutually exclusive time intervals. 
That is, reentry occurs in one of the following intervals [0, 4), [4, 7),, [22, ∞), where a 
month is the unit of the measurement. The basic model assumes that, given a set of 
regressors, Xt, the density function of duration T, is f(t, Xt), and its associated hazard 
function is 
∫∞= t ttt )dsXf(s,)Xf(t,)X λ(t, . (2) 
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Because the exit intervals are [0, a1), [a1, a2),, [ai, ∞), the probability that T is greater 
than or equal to ai, given that T is greater than or equal to ai-1, can be expressed as 
[ ]
i
i
-1i
a
a
a t1ii
P)dsX λ(s,expaTaTProb =


−=>=>= ∫−  , (3) 
where i=1, 2, 3,, m and there are m+1 intervals. In other words, the probability of an 
exit spell ending in interval i is equivalent to the probability that a spell survives to 
interval i-1 and fails in interval i. Hence, the probability is given by 
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We treat survival or failure (reentry) in each time interval as an observation. As a 
result, each FIP case contributes i observations to the likelihood function where i is the 
interval in which reentry takes place. Right-censored exit spells occur when the data 
period ends before the exit spell is completed. For the exit spell censored in a given 
interval, we assume that censoring occurs at the beginning of that interval. That is, if an 
exit spell is censored in interval i, we delete the ith observation and only use i-1 
observations. Given a sample with n individuals, the likelihood function is given as 
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where d=0 if the individual is still at risk and d=1 if reentry occurs. 
To estimate the likelihood function, we use a proportional hazard function λ(t,Xt) = 
λ0(t)φ(β,Xt), where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function and φ(β,Xt) = exp(βXt). Instead 
of specifying the functional form for the baseline hazard, the semiparametric method 
estimates the baseline hazard function for each time interval. The resulting log likelihood 
function can be rewritten as follows: 
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δi is the conditional survival probability in interval i when βXi is equal to zero. 
Our model allows the values of the time-varying covariates to vary across different 
time intervals but requires them to remain constant within the time interval. The time-
varying covariates include quarterly child support collections, educational attainment, 
marital status, number of children, an indicator of the area of residence (metro county vs. 
nonmetro county), and the quarterly local unemployment rate. Time invariant variables 
are gender and race (white or nonwhite). 
Empirical Results. The average estimates of the duration model are reported in Table 
9. We identify several important factors affecting FIP reentry. Higher quarterly wage 
income reduces the reentry hazard. Child support is also negatively related to the 
probability of reentering FIP in a given interval. Surprisingly, the hypothesis that a higher 
current unemployment rate increases the probability of reentry is not supported here. The 
estimated coefficient is insignificant.5  Race and marital status do not affect the reentry 
rate either. Males are less likely to return to FIP than females. Families with a greater 
number of children are more likely to return to welfare. Living in a metro county 
decreases the reentry hazard, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
The estimated coefficients R1 to R7 in Table 9 are used to calculate the hazard rate. 
Figure 1 shows the shape of the reentry (hazard) rate, which is estimated at the sample 
means of the explanatory variables. The hazard rate decreases almost monotonically as 
the exit spell lengthens, confirming the existence of negative duration dependence. In the 
first quarter, the hazard rate is 0.11. By the end of the seventh quarter, the hazard rate 
decreases to nearly 0.05. 
 
Conclusions 
We examined the dynamics of welfare participation and the initial experience of 
welfare reforms in Iowa. Half of the FIP recipients we followed in this study left the 
program within two years. Although improvements in the Iowa economy account for a 
share of the exits, our results provide some evidence that Iowas reform of its welfare 
program as well may have helped reduce the FIP caseloads. 
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Analysis of the dynamics of FIP participation reveals that, on average, FIP recipients 
stayed fewer months on FIP in the second year of the study. However, 58 percent of those 
on FIP throughout the first year remained on FIP during the second year. The decline in 
the average annual total months on FIP is attributed mainly to cases staying on FIP for 
less than six months in the first year. At the same time, there exists a group of FIP 
recipients who experience great difficulties in achieving self-sufficiency. Thirty-six 
percent of FIP cases in our data stayed on FIP for the full two years (Table 5). Under 
TANF, the five-year lifetime limit on receiving benefits may affect this group in a few 
years. They may be without assistance if state governments can exempt only 20 percent 
of their caseloads from the time limit. 
We find that FIP recipients who spent fewer months on FIP in the second year not 
only had more years of schooling, fewer children, higher earnings and child support, but 
also experienced greater growth in earnings and child support compared with those who 
had more months on FIP (Table 5). Multivariate analyses confirm that these factors are 
key determinants for both annual total months on FIP and welfare recidivism. Local 
economic conditions also have an effect on the annual total months on FIP. This finding 
suggests that we can expect an increase in TANF caseloads if the economy slows. 
The average length of a completed exit spell is six months, implying that FIP 
recipients who returned to the program did so quickly. In simulations not reported here, 
we find that the marginal effects of increasing child support and wage income diminish as 
the duration of the exit spell lengthens. In other words, given that the exit spell is short, 
child support and wage income are crucial in determining the chances of exiting from FIP 
and of continuing to stay off of FIP during the early months of the exit. 
The lessons learned here provide a preliminary indication of what we can expect 
from a state TANF program. Iowas experience suggests that human capital, child 
support, marital status, and the presence of children are major determinants of welfare 
dependence and recidivism. Social policies aimed at helping families achieve economic 
self-sufficiency should help assistance program participants finish their formal education, 
provide and impose job training and job search, and further enforce the support of 
children by noncustodial parents. The effects of marital status on reducing welfare 
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dependency and recidivism suggest that the parental responsibility initiatives currently 
underway in Iowa also have potential to help low-income families achieve economic 
self-sufficiency. Clearly, more years of data are needed to estimate fully the effect of 
welfare reform on Iowas FIP population. Particularly, it is important to continue to 
follow those who left the program and to compare their socioeconomic conditions before 
and after the exit. 
Finally, the empirical analyses for this study were conducted using state 
administrative data. Having the opportunity to use administrative data for research is a 
mixed blessing. These data made it possible to conduct analyses that could not have been 
conducted with survey data. On the other hand, they have their own challenges and 
limitations relative to survey data that cannot be ignored. We addressed one of these 
challenges in detail: the problem of missing data for a key explanatory variable 
(educational attainment). Based on our experiences with these data for this and other 
studies, we find that research based on administrative data complements well traditional 
survey-based research and should be encouraged. 
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Table 1. Distribution of educational attainment variable by quarters: October 1993 to 
September 1995 
Observations Patterns by Quarter 
(Percent of Total) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 
16,010 (48.8%) √a √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
14,674 (44.7%)         
1,195 (  3.6%) √ √ √ √ √    
320 (  1.0%)  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
110 (  0.3%)     √ √ √ √ 
474 (  1.6%) All Other Patterns 
Total Observations = 32,783 
a √ represents data are not missing. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of observations with full educational attainment information: 
October 1993 to September 1995 
Observations Patterns 
(Percent of Total) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 
10,230 (63.80%) 1c 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
303 (  1.90%) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
32 (  0.20%) 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
28 (  0.17%) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
59 (  0.37%) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
29 (  0.18%) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
17 (  0.10%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
26 (  0.16%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
5,286 (33.12%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total observations = 16,010 
a 0 = does not have a high school degree. 1 = has at least a high school degree. 
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Table 3. FIP caseloads by demographic variables : October 1993, October 1994, and October 
1995 
 OCTOBER 1993 OCTOBER 1994 OCTOBER 1995 
 
Demographic Variables 
Number of Cases 
(Proportion of 
Identified Cases) 
Number of Cases 
(Proportion of 
Identified Cases) 
Number of Cases 
(Proportion of 
Identified Cases) 
Actual FIP Regular + UP Caseloada 37,600 38,776 34,246 
Total Caseload as Identified in Data 38,632 39,917 35,509 
  On Food Stamp Program (0.89) (0.89) (0.88) 
  Number of Children    
    No Child (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    One Child Case (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
    Two Children Case (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) 
    More Than Two Children Case (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) 
  Area of Residence    
    Living in Metro (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) 
    Living in Urban Nonmetro (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
    Living in Rural Adjacent (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
    Living in Rural Nonadjacent (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
  Earnings and Child Support    
    Family Had Wage Earnings (0.58) (0.65) (0.68) 
    Family Received Child Support (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) 
  Number of Adults    
    No Adult (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    One Adult Case (0.41) (0.39) (0.39) 
    Two Adults Case (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) 
    More Than Two Adults Case (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) 
Gender    
    Male (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
    Female (0.87) (0.87) (0.87) 
  Ethnicity    
    White (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) 
    Black (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
    Others (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
    Missing (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
  Age of Case Head    
    Younger Than 18 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
    Between Age 18 and 21 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
    Older Than 21 (0.91) (0.93) (0.93) 
  Educational Attainment    
    High School, GED or More  (0.28) (0.30) (0.26) 
    Less Than High School (0.19) (0.15) (0.17) 
    Unknown and Missing (0.53) (0.55) (0.57) 
  Age of Youngest Child    
    No Children (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Younger Than 1 (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) 
    Between 1 and 3 (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) 
    Between 3 and 6 (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) 
    Older Than 6 (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) 
a  Obtained from Iowa Department of Human Services monthly reports. 
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Table 4. Dynamics of FIP participation in Iowa: October 1993 to September 1995a 
 Total Time on FIP in the Second Year 
Total Time on 
FIP in the First 
Year 
 
0 Month 
 
1-6 Months 
 
7-11 Months 
 
12 Months 
 
Total 
1-6 Months 78.4 (50.6)b 12.0 (11.9)   6.5 (  6.1)   3.2 (  1.3)  (16.6) 
7-11 Months 50.5 (41.3) 19.4 (24.4) 15.9 (18.9) 14.2 (  7.5)  (21.0) 
12 Months   3.4 (  8.2) 17.1 (63.7) 21.3 (75.0) 58.3 (91.2)  (62.4) 
Total 25.7 16.7 17.7 39.9 100.0 
a Number of observations = 38,632. 
b The first number is the row percentage. The number in parentheses is the column percentage. 
 
  
 
Table 5a. Comparison of selected demographic variables among five patterns of participation: October 1993 to September 1995 
 
Variables 
0 Months in 
Year 2 
N=8,177 
(25.3%) 
Fewer Months in  
Year 2 
N=9,921 
(30.7%) 
Equal Months in  
Year 2 
N=379 
(1.2%) 
More Months in  
Year 2 
N=1,990 
(6.2%) 
All 24 Months in 
Year 2 
N=11,842 
(36.6%) 
 YR. 1 YR. 2 YR. 1 YR. 2 YR. 1 YR. 2 YR. 1 YR. 2 YR. 1 YR. 2 
Annual Wage Income 9,126 12,182 7,278 11,347 8,618 9,882 8,678 8,697 5,538 7,071 
Annual Child Support 630 1,122 218 696 369 411 434 272 156 176 
Number of Children 2.04 2.05 2.16 2.24 2.18 2.25 2.19 2.31 2.27 2.37 
High School or Abovea 0.64 0.66 0.62 0.64 0.58 0.60 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.61 
Married 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.18 
Percentage Employed 0.80 0.77 0.79 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.84 0.85 0.65 0.75 
Quarters Worked 2.58 2.72 2.41 3.0 2.89 2.98 2.75 2.74 1.93 2.31 
Living in Metro County 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.47 0.48 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.55 
Move to Other County 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.06 
 
 
Table 5b. The growth rates of selected demographic variables between the first year and the second year among five dynamic 
participation patterns 
Annual Wage Income 33.5 55.9 14.6 0.2 27.6 
Annual Child Support 78.1 219.0 11.3 -37.3b 12.8 
Number of Children 0.5 3.7 3.2 5.4 4.4 
Married 4.5 5.3 8.7 0.0 0.0 
Percentage Employed -3.7 11.4 1.1 1.2 15.4 
Quarters Worked 5.4 24.5 3.1 -0.3 19.6 
N=32,309 
a The average of 5 imputation data sets is reported. 
b Decline in child support is the combination of an increase in cases that did not receive child support and a decrease in the amount paid 
for those receiving child support.  
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Table 6. Definitions, means, and standard errors of variables 
Variable Mean 
(Standard Error) 
Definition 
Spell 8.566 (4.53) Annual number of months on FIP 
Male 0.091 (0.29) Dichotomous variable equals 1 if FIP 
recipient is male 
White 0.840 (0.36) Dichotomous variable equals 1 if FIP 
recipient is white 
DSCHOOL  0.615 (0.49)a Dichotomous variable equals 1 if FIP 
recipient has a high school degree 
PWAGE 7.610 (0.34)a Predicted quarterly wage income (thousand) 
CS 0.449 (1.08) Annual child support collections (thousand) 
URATE 3.762 (0.95) Annual average local unemployment rate 
(percent) 
NUMCHILD 2.209 (1.31) Number of children at the beginning of the 
year 
DMARRIED 0.041 (0.20) Dichotomous variable equals 1 if married 
during the year 
QMARRIED 0.111 (0.55) Number of quarters being married  
DDIVORCED 0.011 (0.10) Dichotomous variable equals 1 if divorced 
or separated during the year 
QDIVORCED 0.03 (0.27) Number of quarters being divorced or 
separated 
DSINGLE 0.760 (0.43) Dichotomous variable equals 1 if remained 
single through the year 
DMETRO 0.531 (0.50) Dichotomous variable equals 1 if lived in 
metro counties 
a The average of five imputation data sets is reported. 
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Table 7. Average coefficients of the fixed effect model on annual total numbers of 
months on FIP: October 1993 to September 1995a 
Independent Variables Coefficients 
PWAGE -4.450 (0.066)b*** 
CS -1.450 (0.056)*** 
URATE 1.303 (0.041)*** 
NUMCHILD 0.381 (0.05)*** 
DMARRIED 1.433 (0.34)*** 
DMARRIED x QMARRIED -0.420 (0.13)*** 
DDIVORCED -0.540 (0.55) 
DDIVORCED x QDIVORCED 0.362 (0.23) 
DSINGLE 0.860 (0.20)*** 
DMETRO 0.494 (0.14)*** 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.61 
Number of Observations 32,309 
Dependent variable: Annual Total Number of Months on FIP 
a The coefficients and standard deviations for each of the 5 imputed data are reported in Table 10 
in Appendix A 
b Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
*** significant at 1 percent level. 
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Table 8. Distribution of Exit Spells: October 1993 to September 1995 
Duration of Spell All Spells Complete Spells Right-censored 
Spells 
  2 1,596 963 (60)a 633 (40) 
  3 1,427 731 (51) 696 (49) 
  4 1,143 482 (42) 661 (58) 
  5    963 439 (46) 524 (54) 
  6    926 382 (41) 544 (59) 
  7    805 313 (39) 492 (61) 
  8    750 263 (35) 487 (65) 
  9    806 168 (21) 638 (79) 
10    711 142 (20) 569 (80) 
11    766 127 (17) 639 (83) 
12    863 120 (14) 743 (86) 
13    772   97 (13) 675 (87) 
14    732   87 (12) 645 (88) 
15    743 64 (9) 679 (91) 
16    714 42 (6) 672 (94) 
17    605 39 (6) 566 (94) 
18    636 33 (5) 603 (95) 
19    587 27 (5) 560 (95) 
20    615 20 (3) 595 (97) 
21    751 18 (2) 733 (98) 
22    746   6 (1) 740 (99) 
23    725              725 (100) 
Mean Duration      11.10   6.00             12.78 
Numbers of Exit 
Spells 
            18,382          4,563             13,819 
a Row percentages are in parentheses. 
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Table 9. Average maximum likelihood estimates of recidivism: October 1993 to 
September 1995a 
Independent Variables               Coefficients 
Predicted Wage -0.045 (0.02)b** 
Child Support  -0.463 (0.04)*** 
Local Unemployment Rate -0.039 (0.02) 
White (0,1) 0.036 (0.04) 
Married (0,1) -0.002 (0.03) 
Male (0,1) -0.153 (0.05)*** 
Number of Children 0.110 (0.01)*** 
Living in Metro County (0,1) -0.050 (0.03) 
Other Parameters Estimated  
  R7 -2.875 (0.241)*** 
  R6 -3.166 (0.221)*** 
  R5 -2.857 (0.21)*** 
  R4 -2.761 (0.20)*** 
  R3 -2.397 (0.20)*** 
  R2 -2.077 (0.19)*** 
  R1 -2.052 (0.19)*** 
Number of Observations 18,382 
Log Likelihoodb (-15,735.6, -15736.1)c 
a The coefficients and standard deviations for each of the 5 imputed data are reported in Table 11 
in Appendix A 
b Standard errors are in parentheses. 
c The lower and upper bounds of the values of five log likelihood functions are reported. 
*** significant at 1 percent level. 
 ** significant at 5 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Predicted hazard rate evaluated at the sample means. 
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Endnotes 
 
 
1 It is not obvious within the data set whether or not a case is receiving FIP benefits currently. Our 
average monthly error in identifying the actual caseload over the 27-month period October 1993 
through December 1995 was 2.1 percent. Although in each of the Octobers reported here we 
overestimate the caseload, this was not always the case. 
 
2. Note that our data are left censored. That is we do not have information about the case and case 
members prior to April 1993. Further, for these analyses, we do not make use of information prior 
to the start of the FIP program, October 1993. Thus, long-term recipients are defined as having at 
least seven months of benefit receipt within this specific 12-month window. Recipients not 
classified as long-term in these analyses may have actually received AFDC benefits for seven 
months or more prior to October 1993. 
 
3. Recall that our sample consists of FIP recipients in October 1993. Therefore, by definition, 0 
months of receipt in the first year is not possible. 
 
4. Program rules are such that a FIP program participant eligible for a cash benefit of less than $10 
in a given month does not receive a cash benefit that month, but continues to remain eligible for, 
and must participate in, all other aspects of the program as if she/he had received a cash benefit. 
 
5 We also tried to lag the local unemployment rate but the coefficient remained insignificant. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
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Table A-10. Coefficients from the fixed effect model on annual total numbers of months on FIP: October 1993 to September 1995 
 Endogenous Variable: Annual Total Numbers of Months on FIP 
Independent Variables Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 
PWAGE -4.445 (0.09)a*** -4.453 (0.06)*** -4.447 (0.06)*** -4.450 (0.06)*** -4.462 (0.06)*** 
DWAGE -1.447 (0.02)*** -1.446 (0.02)*** -1.447 (0.02)*** -1.446 (0.02)*** -1.446 (0.20)*** 
URATE 1.305 (0.04)*** 1.301 (0.04)*** 1.307 (0.04)*** 1.30 (0.044)*** 1.303 (0.04)*** 
NOCHILD 0.381 (0.05)*** 0.381 (0.05)*** 0.381 (0.05)*** 0.380 (0.05)*** 0.383 (0.05)*** 
DMARRIED 1.437 (0.34)*** 1.430 (0.34)*** 1.436 (0.34)*** 1.421 (0.34)*** 1.442 (0.34)*** 
DMARRIED x QMARRIED -0.425 (0.13)*** -0.424 (0.13)*** -0.424 (0.13)*** -0.421 (0.13)*** -0.426 (0.13)*** 
DDIVORCED -0.538 (0.55) -0.546 (0.55) -0.533 (0.55) -0.543 (0.55) -0.539 (0.55) 
DDIVORCED x QDIVORCED 0.362 (0.23) 0.365 (0.23) 0.361 (0.23) 0.360 (0.23) 0.364 (0.23) 
DSINGLE 0.863 (0.20)*** 0.854 (0.20)*** 0.869 (0.20)*** 0.844 (0.20)*** 0.869 (0.20)*** 
DMETRO 0.490 (0.14)*** 0.496 (0.14)*** 0.503 (0.14)*** 0.480 (0.14)*** 0.502 (0.137)*** 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 
F Statistics 4565.5 4565.5 4565.5 4565.5 4565.5 
Number of Observations 32,309 32,309 32,309 32,309 32,309 
a Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1 percent level. 
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Table A-11. Coefficients from the maximum likelihood estimates of recidivism: October 1993 to September 1995 
 Endogenous Variable: Annual Total Numbers of Months on FIP 
Independent Variables Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 
Predicted Quarterly Wage Income -0.045 (0.02)** -0.045 (0.02)** -0.047 (0.02)** -0.04 (0.02)** -0.048 (0.02)** 
Total Child Support Collections -0.463 (0.04)*** -0.463 (0.04)*** -0.462 (0.04)*** -0.463 (0.04)*** -0.462 (0.04)*** 
Local Unemployment Rate -0.013 (0.02) -0.013 (0.02) -0.014 (0.02) -0.013 (0.01) -0.14 (0.02) 
White 0.036(0.04) 0.036 (0.04) 0.036 (0.04) 0.036 (0.04) 0.036 (0.04) 
Married -0.002 (0.03) -0.002 (0.03) -0.002 (0.03) -0.002 (0.03) -0.002 (0.03) 
Male -0.153 (0.05)*** -0.154 (0.05)*** -0.153 (0.05)*** -0.154 (0.05)*** -0.153 (0.05)*** 
Number of Children 0.11 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.01)*** 
Living in Metro County -0.05 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) 
Other Parameter Estimated      
  R7 -2.875 (0.24)*** -2.878 (0.24)*** -2.859 (0.24)*** -2.91 (0.24)*** -2.853 (0.24)*** 
  R6 -3.166 (0.22)*** -3.17 (0.22)*** -3.151 (0.22)*** -3.20 (0.22)*** -3.145 (0.22)*** 
  R5 -2.857 (0.21)*** -2.86 (0.21)*** -2.842 (0.21)*** -2.89 (0.21)*** -2.836 (0.21)*** 
  R4 -2.761 (0.20)*** -2.764 (0.20)*** -2.746 (0.20)*** -2.795 (0.20)*** -2.74 (0.20)*** 
  R3 -2.397 (0.20)*** -2.40 (0.20)*** -2.382 (0.20)*** -2.431 (0.20)*** -2.377 (0.20)*** 
  R2 -2.077 (0.19)*** -2.08 (0.19)*** -2.063 (0.19)*** -2.109 (0.19)*** -2.057 (0.19)*** 
  R1 -2.052 (0.19)*** -2.054 (0.19)*** -2.038 (0.19)*** -2.083 (0.19)*** -2.032 (0.19)*** 
Number of Observations 18,382 18,382 18,382 18,382 18,382 
Log Likelihood -15,735.8 -15,735.8 -15,735.7 -15,736.1 -15,735.6 
a Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1 percent level. 
 ** significant at 5 percent level. 
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